https://doi.org/10.7592/EJHR.2024.12.3.871

The European Journal of Humour Research 12 (3) 88–109
www.europeanjournalofhumour.org

Quiddity and universality: the transnational origins of humorous far-right memes

Viktor Chagas
Fluminense Federal University, Brazil
viktor@midia.uff.br

Abstract

This study aims to investigate how the Brazilian far-right networks utilising humour appropriate transnational user-generated content and produce internet memes. Such memes undergo an adapted translation to local realities or become a message of a generalist and universal nature, sharing common rhetorical elements or values to contexts as far as Italy, Spain, Ukraine and the Middle East. Based on the analysis of the quiddities of these memes, the article is focused not on identifying the humorous mechanisms of such jokes, but on the ways they alternate between local and universal grammars. There is a wide literature that criticises the interpretation of the superiority theory for laughter. For such literature, the comparative analysis of jokes in different nations highlights how humour follows a transcultural logic (Davies, 1998, 2011). These studies often show that the same motto is found in different contexts, changing only the butt of the joke. This argument would demonstrate a certain universality of humour, against which an also vast body of texts advocates, including some critical humour studies dedicated to investigating humour and hatred, and focusing on neo-Nazis and supremacist jokes (Billig, 2001; Weaver, 2011). Despite these two major trends having widely referenced studies, the transnational character of far-right humour has been relatively neglected. This article proposes to combine these approaches and reconcile these literatures by discussing humorous memes from supporters of the former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, which circulated in WhatsApp groups between 2018 and 2022. The article undertakes an interpretive analysis of such contents and draws attention to the connection between far-right humour and social media populism (Gerbaudo, 2018).

Keywords: far-right humour, transnational memes, quiddity, WhatsApp memes, Brazil

1. Introduction

There is a historical strife in humour studies regarding how different jokes can be when adapted to specific local contexts. On the one side, there are advocates of a linguistic-culturalist approach to humour, for whom the cultural identities attributed to the targets of the joke can simply be exchanged for others, without prejudice to laughter, which denotes the property of humour as a

universal genre. In short, it makes little difference whether the butt of a joke is Irish or Jewish, Spanish or Portuguese. The fact that the jokes alternate between these characters' national identities suggests that laughter is a condition superior to the political and social context (Davies, 1998; 2011). On the other, there are those aligned with a socio-psychological perspective of humour, notably the so-called *critical humour studies*, for whom it is essential to observe the power relationship between the entities of a given joke, and the affinity between the teller and his audience (Weaver, 2011). This dispute is also reflected in theoretical perspectives on humour, with the first group generally adhering to the incongruity theory, while the second would subscribe to the relief or superiority theories. The divergence becomes heated when faced with objects of an obvious political nature: racist, misogynistic or LGBTQIA+phobic jokes, for instance. It is no surprise that much of the literature on critical humour studies is dedicated to studying far-right humour. Typically, however, their analyses focus on specific, locally defined, context-driven cases (Billig, 2001; Pérez, 2022).

Thus, while there is wide literature that discusses jokes from a transnational or transcultural perspective, it generally rejects the idea that humour is rooted in social oppression, arguing that there are jokes with similar mottos in different nations (Davies, 1998). On the other hand, critical humour studies argue that looking at the specificities of humour as practiced by extremist groups allows one to understand the political uses of jokes (Billig, 2001). This study aims to investigate how the Brazilian far-right networks utilising humour appropriate transnational user-generated content and produce internet memes to be circulated in political discussions of private messaging groups. Such memes undergo an adapted translation to local realities or become a message of a generalist and universal nature, sharing common rhetorical elements or values to contexts as far as Italy, Spain, Ukraine and the Middle East. Based on the analysis of the quiddities of these memes, the article is focused not on identifying the humorous mechanisms of such jokes but on the ways they alternate between local and universal grammars. By doing so, this article aims to reconcile these two literatures, addressing humorous memes produced and circulated by supporters of the former Brazilian president Bolsonaro on WhatsApp. The transnational elements of the analysed memes allow us to shed light on how digital humour favours translations to local contexts (Shifman et al., 2014).

The study undertakes an interpretive analysis of different meme families and draws attention to the connections between far-right humour and social media populism (Gerbaudo, 2018). The analysis is based on a comparative and multi-situated approach, reinforcing cultural traits and local contexts of these memes. Selected cases correspond to memes that circulated on WhatsApp political discussion groups of supporters of the former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, between 2018 and 2022, chosen on the basis of previous inductive observation of ethnographic inspiration. When it comes to studying far-right humour, cases from the North usually have greater prominence. Much is known about the reality of Nazi groups in Europe or Trumpism in the United States, but little is known about this topic in countries such as those in Latin America.

The article is strongly anchored in a discursive and interpretive paradigm and a voluntary and non-probabilistic sample. There is no intention of objectively exhausting the topic with the analysis of this corpus, but of raising grounded hypotheses. Therefore, the analysis focuses on a small number of cases observed in detail. The cases simultaneously reflect on the impossibility of a skeptical attitude towards political or literal interpretations of humour, as well as the need for a transcultural dimension on humour, one that could draw under a common semantics to the mechanics of laughter.

2. Quiddity and universality in far-right humour

Davies' (2011) definition of humour as "playing with aggression" is generally used to claim that comicality and even mockery are not causal factors in conflicts, although they can inspire a climate of opinion. In Davies' interpretation (2011, p. 6), jokes are jokes, and politics is politics. According to him, the most offensive joke is less violent than explicit discrimination. In the introduction to the special issue of the *European Journal of Humour Research* dedicated to his memory, Chiaro and Kuipers (2017, p. 6) state that "[w]hile this generally brought him in conflict with scholars who positioned themselves on the left or liberal side of the political spectrum, he equally disapproved of such a one-dimensional mood analysis on the political (far) right". Anyway, Davies' position has always been to criticise perceptions of humour as arising from conflict and superiority. His conceptualisation of playful aggression thus embeds an argument similar to that of Gross (1901) regarding play as a preparative exercise, that is, a simulated reality that should not be taken seriously. Opposing what he would consider to be a "politically correct" interpretation of humour, Davies (2011, p. 6) argues that the joke does not inflict harm on its eventual targets, and that "war is made of blood and iron".

In defence of Davies, and sharing some of his views, Oring (2008) claims that, contrary to Freud's (2017[1905]) assumption that humour would allow certain social taboos to be overcome and would function as a covert form of violence, it is possible to attribute to humorous framing a softening of the seriousness of the message. For Oring, although humour can, in fact, mask aggression, its main goal is to prevent the use of violence itself. Needless to say, this perspective directly clashes with that of researchers in critical humour studies, who, far from focusing on the mechanics of the joke, seek to pay attention to its social effects. According to Billig (2001, p. 268), humour demands a suspension of empathy, as one should not sympathise with the object of ridicule. Furthermore, regarding far-right humour, ambivalent behaviour is usual, assuming a democratic face in public, while, in private circles, it more clearly incorporates extremism (Billig, 2001, p. 271). The author concludes that supremacist groups should not be expected to openly propagandise racism.

Pérez (2013, 2022) echoes this position. For him, racist humour makes racism palatable and exempts it from public embarrassment. In this way, publicly censored behaviours are released, exactly as in Bakhtin's (1984) principle of carnivalisation. This is what Revi (2014) defines as the theory of trivialisation, that is, a process according to which the serious consequences of an action are removed, resulting in the absence of threats. Billig (2001, p. 283) even opposes Davies' playful aggression to the notion of "lynching as joke", to claim that the joke is equivalent to a lynching of another nature.

However, the dispute between the authors remains grounded in two perspectives of understanding the nature of humour. Davies, for instance, reads laughter from its mechanics. From this, the joke characters can interchange and the laughter will still be achievable. The scholar's argument is based on an extensive comparative analysis of jokes with similar themes told in different countries. Davies' argument is that the identities of the butt of the joke are changeable, but the mechanics of laughter remain. He maps out transcultural variants of the same jokes and realises that the very same narrative that has a stupid character described as Irish is retold in Ireland with the Kerrymen as the target ethnicity. Thus, although it is possible to perceive the prevalence of one or another ethnic group in the dataset, the alternations between the targets attest to the universality of the jokes.

And indeed, Davies has a point. Although he does not mention this in his analysis, the Brazilian case is exemplary. Jokes depicting stupid characters in Brazil invariably describe the nationality of these characters as Portuguese. And, interestingly, many of the same jokes told in Brazil are found in Portugal with the *Alentejanos* as the target ethnic group. When it comes to recognising historical cultural contexts, however, the emergence of Portuguese jokes in Brazil

serves very specific circumstances. They date back to the immediate post-Republic period, when there was a movement to not only replace all national monarchy symbols but also to eliminate cultural references to the coloniser. Therefore, while the jokes retain a universalist motto, they are essentially an affirmative action with significant contextual particularity.

Although the contention between culturalist and critical perspectives, represented here by Davies and Billig, remains alive among humour scholars, it is not our task to give a definitive and prevailing answer as to which position is most appropriate. What can be said is that reducing humour to a reading of the linguistic mechanisms of comedy implies a risk of neglecting the context of social and historical inequalities of which this same humour is an integral part. On the other hand, valuing specific aspects concerning local hierarchies does not always allow one to recognise how laughter accounts for a process of translation and subsequent adaptation to different cultural or national contexts.

Boxman-Shabtai and Shifman (2013), for example, emphasise that, when it comes to digitising humour, there is an operation of translating both local humour to non-local humour, and vice-versa. Different mechanisms are activated during these processes, such as the neutralisation of ethnic characteristics in favour of a global characterisation, or, on the other hand, the stereotyping of cultural representations in a polysemic way. Shifman et al. (2014) argue that the circulation of translated web-based jokes has become increasingly common, but memes that become mainstream usually include only a few minor alternations, such as name changes or simple adaptations to the original text. Furthermore, they say, some pieces are more resistant to translation into local contexts and therefore do not become "global hits".

In the same vein, regarding Estonian memes, Laineste and Voolaid (2016) state that the fact that memes have become a kind of pervasive language makes them increasingly permeated by mundane and universal themes, which do not require major adaptations to the local context and that's why they work well as viral content. Their frames of reference often make use of intertextual elements from global pop culture and are therefore accessible to large audiences. This is what Shifman et al. (2014) also describe when they define memes as "agents of globalisation", and what Milner (2013) calls "media lingua franca".

Laineste and Voolaid (2016, p. 44) also remind us that "[n]ot everything in a meme can be understood by all potential recipients: its complex multi-layered structure consists of references that are accessible to most, side by side with those that are unfamiliar and remain 'closed'". They draw attention to how global meme exploitables are reworked locally through a process of "resemiotisation and entextualisation", often adapting specific elements of the multimodal environment to the local context. They note that while the textual message of memes is based on wordplay and therefore largely untranslatable, the visual elements are also loaded with symbols and allusions to local culture, a process described by Denisova (2020) as "meme travel". Still, although many memes sound hermetic outside certain cultural contexts or even outside certain online subcultures, it is usually enough for one reference to be accessible for them to become popular.

The process of alternating references from the local to the global context and vice versa meets Segev et al.'s (2015) own definition for memes, which they describe as a mix of "fixed" and "fungible" elements. Fixed elements are those that in a certain way guarantee a higher cohesiveness of meme families, while fungible elements are those that provide greater uniqueness or singularity in relation to their generic attributes. It is in this context that Segev et al. (2015, p. 3) define a meme quiddity "both as 'hooks' for creators in the generation of new meme instances and as interpretative cues that help consumers recognise specific instances as part of a specific meme family". Put another way, quiddities provide cohesion between meme instances to compose a family of memes, while generic attributes help compose a larger network that links all families of memes to the whole language. The authors provide multiple examples of quiddities, based on recurring phrases, specific or generic characters, or objects. However,

their definition is materially circumscribed by the content of the memes. It is perfectly suitable to understand as quiddities any and all distinctive elements of one joke in relation to another. Quiddities are therefore simultaneously a feature that gives uniqueness and structure to the meme.

If memes are to be translated into a local context, this operation is only possible because the meme structure remains recognisable and accessible to its audiences. Quiddities are exactly what guarantees a universal application to the humour of memes. It is only because one can identify a common semantic and intertextual layer that that joke makes sense. And, ultimately, this is precisely the device that far-right humour employs in reducing and emptying signifiers to shallow stereotypes shared within common sense. In short, far-right memes are often instilled with generic values, typical of the Traditionalist agenda (Teitelbaum, 2020), such as messianic religiosity, militarism as hero worship, anticommunism, the exaltation of heteronormative masculinity, and nationalism as an opposition to what is different or foreign. It is precisely because they are generic and imprecise that they can be adapted and translated to the most different local contexts. This is, of course, not exclusive to the far-rights, but as far as we are concerned, this property has been essential for the creation of far-right transnational humour.

3. Social media populism and transnational memes

As a vehicle for humour, memes have always been recognised for their ability to condense speech. Milner (2013, p. 2360), a decade ago, already described them as populist means for expressing public perspectives. Studying the memes of the Occupy Wall Street movement, he highlighted how these artefacts have the ability to speak on behalf of the "people" and give rise to an anti-systemic discourse, with a strong counter-hegemonic appeal. On the other hand, amid the profusion and confusion of such memes, he calls its spread a chaotic polyvocality, which often hinders communication, as there are many competing voices for restricted attention and visibility. Thus, instead of a more democratic communication open to a greater plurality of producers, the outcome would be a "daily deluge of jokes" (Milner, 2013b, p. 2388) and a fierce dispute for discursive positions between different groups.

Phillips and Milner (2017) also draw on this attention competition model to discuss Mouffe's (1999) agonistic democracy theory. They rely on this theoretical framework to explain how certain online subcultures invest in the building of an "us-them" discourse, typical of populist rhetoric.

Gerbaudo (2018) claims that there is an elective affinity between social media and populism. According to Gerbaudo, the networking and broadcasting affordances of social media provide a suitable channel for populism. This ambivalent nature of such spaces and the content they circulate simultaneously allows these arenas to be appropriated as a community of supporters and as a mechanism for the rapid spread of messages. Furthermore, their architecture favours plebiscitary visions aligned with populist rhetoric. As user-generated content distributed mainly in these arenas, memes are the rhetorical materiality of this process.

Similar to Gerbaudo's argument, Baldwin-Philippi (2018) contends that digital platforms favour candidates and movements that perform populism. She argues that candidates and parties know how to use rhetoric that opposes people and elites, and lists four practices prevalent among populist politicians: *controlled interactivity*, *the use of amateur production techniques*, *encouraging user-generated content*, and *data-campaigning*. Memes serve these four practices: they are user-generated content, without professional finishing, their humour provides strong engagement, and their circulation constitutes affinity networks.

Although populist discourse is not exclusive to the right-wing, or the far-right, there is a plenty of studies dedicated to exploring this association. In a recent one, Wagner and

Schwarzenegger (2020) suggest that the use of satirical humour and memes has grown as a form of populist communication thanks to digital culture. The authors argue that humour can be used as social criticism of elites but also to sway public opinion, and that digital media has made it easier for political actors to employ humour, and thus reach a wide audience. Humour has been used as a strong weapon to delegitimise opponents (Santos, 2019; Lobanov, 2020; Tsai, 2020), constructing either the image of the ordinary citizen (Mendonça & Caetano, 2020) or that of the virile hero or saviour (Lamerichs et al., 2018; Chagas, 2024), and reviving tropes of a nationalist memory and a mythical past of glories (Bogerts & Fielitz, 2018; Moreno-Almeida & Gerbaudo, 2021).

Memes are suitable vehicles for populist rhetoric also because they can simultaneously simplify and complexify an argument. Memes work like digital soundbites, and their humour combines quiddity and universality. Bennett and Toft (2008) claim that large-scale rapid collective actions in digital environments are generally facilitated by open stories, which allow their appropriation at both an individual and inter-organisational level. They assert that narratives that maintain the ability to circulate across distinct social divides, that present generic and pre-figurative elements, and that are not constrained by a specific timeline or event are able to garner an affinity-based mobilisation in a relatively short term. The authors suggest that digital arenas are essentially networking devices and narratives that circulate in these spaces provide the interpretative framing for organisations or individuals. That is why it is so important that messages have an inclusive and indeterminate character, in order to spread through weak ties.

Regarding far-right studies, literature seems to highlight the transnational articulation of these movements, while at the same time looks closely at the role played by humour and particularly by memes in the digital environment. Chagas and Massuchin (2022) highlight that some far-right repertoires are shared by movements and parties in distinct countries from Europe to the Americas, Asia and Africa. The authors also draw attention to how humour has itself become an important repertoire for softening the image of these groups and attracting new supporters. Moreno-Almeida and Gerbaudo (2021), regarding the Moroccan context, conclude that memes are an effective entry point to the far-right. Bogerts and Fielitz (2018) have a similar understanding of fashwave aesthetic memes in Germany, arguing that their visual rhetoric is appropriate for media guerrilla warfare or what some authors have called memetic warfare.[1] Studies such as those by Nagle (2017) and Teitelbaum (2020), using different methods, and in different contexts, have highlighted the validity of memes as a strategic repertoire of the far-right. Few of these studies, however, refer to the use of memes in a transnational or transcultural context.

And, while it is quite common for humorous memes to be understood as subversive and counter-hegemonic content, they also favour reactionary and ultra-conservative agendas (Chagas, 2023). This is a contradiction noted by Kristensen and Mortensen (2021), who point out that in the same way that memes serve to expose and satirise populist politicians, they are also present in the communicative strategies of these same actors. This ambivalence is also identified by Boukes and Hameleers (2020), for whom the same satire that populist politicians use can serve as an antidote to their own rhetoric.

[1] Fashwave is not exclusive to the German context. It is an adaptation of the alternative aesthetics of vaporwave by the far-right in different countries. More about this aesthetics and some examples can be observed on the Global Network on Extremism and Technology website (retrieved 30 November 2023): https://gnet-research.org/2023/06/28/understanding-fashwave-the- alt-rights-ever-evolving-media-strategy/. There are also locally adapted versions of fashwave, such as Trumpwave and Bolsowave. More on Bolsowave, please refer to the Vice story (retrieved 30 November 2023): https://www.vice.com/pt/article/8xwn4a/bolsonaro-e-vaporwave-a-tentativa-estetica-tardia-de -a-government-that-rejects-art.

But although this topic is little discussed, there seems to be a significant distinction between left-wing and right-wing populist uses of memes. A first clue to this difference is the degree of coordination and the sharing of common exploitables, generally describing a moral decadence landscape. While the left-wing, like any social group or online subculture, tends to share common cultural references, the far-right has a much more peculiar behaviour. In this latest case, there is a strong tendency for memes to adopt commonplace discourse, with ideas and imageries that allow a quick translation into different locales. They generally work as a visual parody (Mendonça & Caetano, 2020) and carry open narratives. Generalist mottos such as the minimal state and *laissez-faire*, the war against communism, the war against drugs, threats to the traditional heteronormative family or against the flag of gender equality, the traditionalism of Christian faith, and other agendas similarly articulated by ultra-conservative groups serve as input for humour without borders, based on empty signifiers and an "us-them" antagonism, a script largely described by Laclau (2007) as the very definition of populism.

4. Methods

This article is structured on the basis of an interpretive approach (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012) to a voluntary and non-probabilistic sample of memes extracted from an extensive online ethnography of Brazilian far-right political discussion groups in a private communication service. The ethnography has been carried out since the first half of 2018, therefore, even before the election of Jair Bolsonaro, and continues to this day, with groups that remain in regular activity. Around 200 to 250 groups are observed, although the number is hard to pinpoint, since the base is changeable over time, and it is usual for groups to have their name changed or to become clandestine during specific periods, to change their administration, suffer or perform invasions, merge or freeze groups, ban or add users. The database has around 20,000 users, but this number is equally imprecise.

Due to the risk concerning the safety of the researcher and the study itself, non-participant observation is the main protocol carried out through a covert research approach, in which the researchers do not introduce themselves or the objectives of the study to the subjects. Access to public WhatsApp discussion groups was obtained through a snowball technique using public invitation links that circulate in distinct groups. The covert research strategy is necessary because once researchers come forward or are identified, they are summarily banned from these groups, if not persecuted. Covert research therefore differs from ordinary non-participant observation in that the researchers are not and cannot be identified and the subjects are not informed about the research and do not consent to it. Furthermore, this is an observation conducted through a private messaging service, so that, even though all monitored groups are public ones, researchers have access to users' private data, such as their telephone numbers. In view of these aspects, this is a controversial approach and requires consideration by an ethics committee. This study is ethically supported by the Brazilian National Research Ethics Council under the permission No. 29720620.8.0000.5243. All data collected during ethnographic research is duly anonymised and no private data is stored.

The content circulated in the groups is collected systematically, including images and other media. From this systematic data collection, the sample used is a non-probabilistic one for two specific reasons. First, it is virtually impossible to create a probabilistic sample of the content circulating on WhatsApp, due to the characteristic opacity of the environment (Chagas & Da-Costa, 2023). Second, the study does not aim to produce a representative analysis of the content that circulates in the monitored groups. Its goal was to analyse rhetorical patterns where transnational elements are evoked by the humorous content. To this end, a large-scale material

analysis of these data is of little use. Precisely for this same reason the study preferred an analysis of a small *corpus*, produced voluntarily and selected based on specific criteria.

The criteria considered memes that objectively referred to transnational or transcultural elements or that represented global references. Then, a reverse search engine was used aiming to find similar content from other sources. Not all memes resulted in a collection of images from more than one cultural or idiomatic context. However, some presented text-translated variants, which may be considered a clue to their transnational circulation. Under this protocol, a bundle of images were selected based on their exemplarity, and three representative dimensions were later explored by this study after these cases. The selected cases are thickly described below and organised according to such dimensions in which the underlying humour is anchored. In some cases, memes are built of superimposed images, in others they are created of changed subtitles. In certain cases, adaptation occurs through the insertion of characters or local references, in others, through simple language replacement. Below, we describe in detail the selected families of memes.

5. Discussion

The memes analysed in this article are Brazilian far-right ones extracted from discussion groups that explicitly express support for former president Jair Bolsonaro. Not all of them have hateful content, some are just pieces of political proselytism. All pieces were originally extracted from ethnographic observations in public political discussion groups on WhatsApp, while their variants were obtained from searches in reverse image search engines.

While there are memes that exclusively mobilise intertextual references at a local or national level, those that constitute the body of interest of this article are precisely those that tacitly or verbally present some transnational or transcultural element. The analysis focused either on humorous memes that share intertextual references from global pop culture or whose templates or exploitables suggest their circulation in other local contexts beyond Brazil. In general, the vast majority of mapped images feature iconographic elements (characters, national symbols) superimposed on globally spread templates, or alternation and idiomatic translation of subtitles, as well as adaptation of texts to the local context.

Exempting from carrying out an analysis of the dangerous discourse, the iconographic violence or the extremist ideology contained in these materials, the study sought to observe the transnational grammar of such humour. The analysis of these materials was therefore based on three distinct dimensions regarding the humour contained in these memes. Such dimensions can be broadly described as (1) adapted-translated memes (idiomatically or referentially), (2) memes that state explicit differentiations or comparisons, or (3) memes whose intention is to transcend the particular, based on an alleged universality of humour. Below, each of these veins is discussed in detail, using some visual examples.

5.1. Adapted translation (idiomatically or referentially)

This is by far the most usual type, even because it is a common characteristic of meme humour, as observed by a series of other authors (Shifman et al., 2014; Nissenbaum & Shifman, 2018). In this case, the use of intertextual references and allusions to global pop culture media products merged with national symbols and elements of the local context are very common. In many of these memes, there is a kind of internationally widespread template that is filled with references to local events and characters, so that the result invariably expresses a unique and distinct piece, often understood only by natives. That is, the translation localises the text.

In Figure 1, we have an image that illustrates several WhatsApp group covers of Bolsonaro supporters, and a meme that is repeatedly triggered every time the former president demanded

support from his bases. In the image, Bolsonaro is portrayed as a superhero, with costumes and weapons (the shield) identical to Captain America. In addition to the obvious patriotic and Manichaean interpretation of good versus evil, the figure of Captain America also evokes in a good-humoured way the past of Bolsonaro, himself an Army captain. In the background, Marshal Humberto Castello Branco (1897-1967) and General João Baptista Figueiredo (1918-1999) are portrayed, respectively the first and last presidents of the military dictatorial regime that lasted from 1964 to 1985 in Brazil, to whom Bolsonaro often pays tribute. In addition to the explicitly nationalist and revisionist nature, the image presents a play on the idea that Bolsonaro would be a soldier (or a "supersoldier") serving the country just like a comic book hero.

Bolsonaro as Brazilian Captain America

Figure 1. Bolsonaro as Brazilian Captain America

Something similar occurs in Figure 2 when Bolsonaro is presented in a game reference. The face of the former Brazilian president replaces the one from the main character of Wolfenstein 3D, the fictional American spy of Polish descent William Joseph "B.J." Blazkowicz, who faces the Nazis during World War II. It is still possible to observe a wordplay with Trump's famous slogan, "Make Brazil [America in Trump's case] Great Again", which reinforces the transnational parallelism. The allusion to the game draws on Bolsonaro and his supporters' gun rights advocacy. As Wolfenstein 3D is greatly responsible for popularising the first-person shooter genre, the use of the image favours the interpretation of Bolsonaro as a contemporary freedom fighter. The appeal to comics and games is not surprising, as they represent youthful references, and at the same time allow for the creation of a bond with middle-aged adults, one of the age groups with the highest incidence of Bolsonaro supporters in Brazil.



Figure 2. Bolsonaro as Wolfenstein 3D's hero

The third example, still in this same category of translation memes, is Figure 3. The content is similar to the previous ones. It is a generic image with Bolsonaro's face superimposed on it. In this case, we have a painting entitled "Against the Wind", by Liz Lemon Swindle (1953-), a painter known for her religious paintings, particularly those related to Jesus Christ and motifs or passages reported by the cosmology of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS Church). In Brazil, Mormons account for just over 0.5% of the population. Data from 2021 shows 1,456,238 church members in the country and around 2,700 congregations (LDS Church, 2023). Although it is not one of the religions with the most followers in the country, Mormon art dialogues with the neo-Pentecostal Christian imaginary that reflect an important portion of Bolsonaro's supporters. Swindle's devotional art is also very reminiscent of the paintings of Lucimary Billhardt, a Brazilian naïve artist who regularly produces many apologetic works with Bolsonaro as the protagonist and has become something of a joke among government opponents due to its excessively proselytising tone.[2]

[2] For more about Billhardt's proselytising art, see this story (retrieved 29 November 2023): https://tab.uol.com.br/stories/arte-de-direita/. The artist displays several of her paintings on her own Instagram profile (retrieved 29 November 2023): https://www.instagram.com/lucimarybillhardt/.



Figure 3. Bolsonaro against the wind

Swindle's art does not enjoy a humorous vein. But, as in the previous images, the comical reference has to do with the incongruity presented through the insertion of Bolsonaro's image, in a clear amateur montage. The image in itself is not funny, and Bolsonaro's supporters who share it do not aim to satirise or mock Bolsonaro's image, quite the opposite. But there is a certain degree of playfulness in the meme that simultaneously points to the neo-Pentecostalist electorate and Bolsonaro's anti-systemic and populist discourse. The image depicts the apostle Peter sinking after attempting to walk on water, and, as one of our anonymous reviewers states, probably attests to some irony in the comparison between Peter and Bolsonaro. In the original passage, Peter fails to walk on water after diverting his attention. The excerpt is a parable about the need to believe in the impossible. In this case, the piece does not ridicules Bolsonaro, but builds an ironical comparison. Humour is in the dog whistle. Nonetheless, this meme also became the target of ridicule among the former president's opponents due to the *Kitsch* aesthetic of the original painting. But it is good to remember that this aesthetic is once again consistent with the intentional use of the ugly and the amateur (or naïve, in this case) among Bolsonarists. Furthermore, the messianic tone of the image and its caption in Portuguese ("Hold my hand, Captain... We still have an entire country to save") complete the thematic triad of pop culture, militarism and charismatic religion that appears with great frequency among the content circulated by the far-right in Brazil.

A final example of this same category can be seen in Figure 4, which is a more classic meme. In this case, we have an exploitable object that works like a comic strip. The image first appeared around 2016 and depicts a soldier taking knives, grenades and other projectiles in the back in order to protect a child, who is sleeping comfortably in bed. The original comic was published on Facebook by the fan page *Laughing Colours* and was drawn by the pseudonymous artist Utkal Gaurab (Know Your Meme, 2019). In 2017, the comic began to be reappropriated in subsequent edits, in which the soldier, the bombs or the child are comically labelled. In Figure 4 constellation, it is possible to notice several Brazilian variants of this meme. In all of them, there is a translation of the image's signifiers into the Brazilian context. These alternations do not always imply an idiomatic translation. In some of the images present in the painting, the English language is preserved, as a way of legitimising the transnational appeal of the meme.

Thus, the "Silent Protector" becomes the "Silent Betrayer" by representing Bolsonaro being betrayed by his former ally, former Judge Sérgio Moro, former Minister of Justice, responsible for the arrest now considered a "historical error" (Bergamo, 2023) of now President Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva. Moro left the Bolsonaro government in 2020, accusing him of intervening in federal investigations, but, in the 2022 Elections, he returned to support the former president. Another important historical reference is that Bolsonaro actually suffered a knife attack during the electoral race in 2018. The metaphor that represents him being stabbed therefore has a double layer of meaning. In addition to Moro, Bolsonaro is also under attack from the main Brazilian television network (Globo), from liberal alternative media outlets (The Intercept), and the Supreme Court (STF). He is, therefore, the usual representation of counter-hegemonic authoritarian populism.

Other variations are no less contextually situated. In one of the images, Carlos Bolsonaro, one of the former president's sons, is the protective soldier, while Jair Bolsonaro sleeps peacefully. Carlos is the second of Bolsonaro's five children and for much of his term in office, he was responsible for political communication on the president's social media, being elevated to a position of great visibility. He, however, was heavily criticised for the radicalised content of some posts. The opposition also appropriated this same meme exploitable. In this case, Brazil sleeps peacefully and inadvertently, while the coronavirus represents an imminent threat. Bolsonaro, who acts as a soldier, instead of protecting the child, is also a threat posed against him.

Finally, in this same series, we have an image again subtitled in English, in which Bolsonaro is represented as the soldier who protects Brazil against socialism. The interesting thing about this image is that it is shared with an attached external caption, which describes it as a "cartoon published in *Time* magazine", followed by the comment "by far the best expression I've ever seen about our current situation. Congratulations to the creator". This meme was never published in *Time*. But the caption reinforces, through the rhetorical appeal to an argument of authority or credibility of the source, the transnational character of this meme's humour.

The original art

The silent protector: Carlos Bolsonaro protects Jair Bolsonaro

The silent betrayer: Moro stabs Bolsonaro

Bolsonaro threats Brazil

Bolsonaro protects Brazil

Subtitles: "Cartoon published in American Time magazine. By far the best expression I've ever seen about our current situation. Congratulations to the creator."

The Silent Protector meme family

Figure 4. The Silent Protector meme family

Adapted translation is an operation through which a given humorous meme becomes locally situated. The joke's characters or their original situation change, but there is a structure that remains unchanged, deliberately preserving elements that allow access to the understanding that it is remixed content. While this resource is not exclusive to far-right humour, Bolsonarism knew how to appropriate this type of repertoire with a lot of innovation (Chagas, 2023; 2024). The result of this type of intervention is always a joke that has its references restricted to a limited audience, without any explicit reference to other national or cultural contexts. It is therefore a movement from the universal to the idiosyncratic.

5.2. Explicit differentiations or comparisons

In relative opposition to the first type, there is another common model among the humorous memes that circulate in far-right groups in Brazil, represented by images that make explicit comparisons with other national realities. This is a relative opposition, because, to a large extent, there are also overlaps between these types, as these explicit comparisons often make use of adapted translation. In Figure 5, we have an unequivocal example of this kind of use. This is a classic object-labelled exploitable, usually called the Death Knocking on Doors meme. The illustration depicts a ghostly Grim Reaper, with a skull face and a scythe, repeatedly knocking on several doors. Each door is typically labelled after a specific element. The cartoon is usually used to refer to a sequence of defeats or a metaphorical massacre.



Figure 5. The Death Knocking on Doors meme family

The earliest instance of this meme was published in August 2013 on *Taringa!*, an Argentinian online community created in 2004. The image was originally illustrated by an artist who goes by the pseudonym xelha999, according to Know Your Meme (2018). Its main theme of criticism was the United States military interventions in other countries. This same image served as a case study for Denisova (2020) when she elaborated on the concept of "meme travel". In her book, however, Denisova emphasises the variants of this meme concerning Euromaidan, the crisis between Ukraine and Russia, from 2013 to 2014, which culminated, years later, in the current war in Ukraine. In the images presented by the author, the names of some countries are changed and the name of Ukraine is added, as the last door of the invading United States. On the Russian side, some of the images feature Ukraine's response to the American Grim Reaper, others feature Russian national symbols fending off the threat. On the Ukrainian side, in turn, it is Russia who is represented as the Grim Reaper.

The meme travel case explored by Denisova was one of the inspirations for this text. This is because, in the Brazilian context, this same memetic family is seen. In this case, however, the neighbours are Latin American neighbours. The Grim Reaper represents communism. And Bolsonaro is the unexpected defender, always armed. Interestingly, however, the former president does not appear, as usual, at the last door, but at the second to last. This alternation makes it clear that the communist threat does not cease and continues to persecute other countries. Furthermore, Bolsonaro is only responsible for saving his own nation. The rest continue to be massacred. Finally, as in the variation of the Silent Protector meme, here there is also a caption that operates as an index of ethos. It reads: "Cartoon of the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio", in what would allegedly be an accreditation that Bolsonaro would be a relevant character on the international scene. The cartoon was never published, neither in its original version nor in its variants by the Chilean newspaper (Menezes, 2021). Instead, we simply have a meme whose humour refers to an explicit comparison between nationalities.

The humour of the Brazilian far-right often resorts to this type of differentiation. It works as an element of distinction to accredit Bolsonaro. Brazil is often compared to Venezuela by the Brazilian right-wing. And, more recently, especially with regard to economic policy, also with Argentina. Chile, which appears in the cartoon, was contextually inserted, due to the debate on the promulgation of a new constitution and the election of a left-wing leader for the country's presidency, Gabriel Boric. In all these cases, neighbouring countries are negative counterpoints, and Brazil is saved by Bolsonaro.

While the transnational character of this humour also largely focuses on a movement of adapted translation, this piece in particular verbalises the comparison with other national identities and allows the joke to be understood even by those who do not know the Brazilian political scene in depth. It is an internationalised right-wing humour, and the meme acts as a pendulum, from the universal to the particular, and from there, back to the universal. While understanding the local context can add a few layers of meaning to the joke, it is built on broader foundations that do not require this knowledge. And, ultimately, understanding the structure of the meme and its purpose is more important than in the previous case.

5.3. Alleged universality

In the latter case, we have a contextually located visual reference erased or neglected in favour of a generalist appropriation. Figure 6 is an example of this kind of operation. In it, we see an elderly woman wearing a headscarf in the form of a hijab talking to a boy. In the first frame, she is depicted in front of some tombs in a cemetery. In the subsequent frame, the characters appear in close-up, with the old woman and the boy crying profusely, and a landscape with many more tombs than before.

The cartoon is signed by an unidentified Arab artist. It originally circulated in the Syrian context with a critical message that can be freely translated from the following dialogue:

– These, my son, are the victims of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
– And these, my son, are the victims of the Arabs' conflicts with each other.

The image remained relatively dormant for some time but was recovered and achieved great circulation during the Covid-19 pandemic. The first version that we were able to identify already takes on an ideologically conservative tone and gained popularity in Italy. The strip draws on a new dialogue:

– These, my son, are the people who died as a result of the coronavirus.
– And these, my son, are those killed by poverty.

Then, from Italian to Spanish, the meme travels and is once again altered. However, it retains much of the dialogue presented in the previous version.

– These, my son, are those who died from coronavirus.
– And these, my son, are those killed by hunger and poverty.

The cartoon does not emphasise a message of fraternity anymore but focuses on a message of discredit. The woman belittles the victims of Covid-19 and suggests that this would be a minor problem compared to hunger or poverty. The meme turned into a conservative and reactionary content. It is also imbued with misinformation.

In 2020, the first Portuguese versions arrived in Brazil. The kinship is altered, and the lady now says to the boy:

– Grandson, these are the people who died from coronavirus...
– And these, my grandson, are those who died from "respiratory failure".

The translation in this case creates a new context and concerns the way in which Jair Bolsonaro's supporters mocked the Covid-19 death rates. They argued that the indices were manipulated to create a false impression of gravity among the population. And that there would be countless cases of death from respiratory failure that would be falsely classified as deaths from Covid-19. Casting doubt on the statistics, the meme takes a new ideological turn. The quotation marks in "respiratory failure" reinforce the mocking and provocative tone.

But, once Bolsonaro's discourse on the pandemic had been dismantled, and with Brazil having confirmed more than 700,000 victims of Covid-19 from 2020 so far, a second Portuguese version of the meme began to circulate. In it, the dialogue becomes:

– Grandson, these are the people who died from coronavirus...
– ... and these are the ones who died for believing in socialism and communism!

The plot once again falls under cultural backlash. The outcome makes it clear that no matter how large the number of victims resulting from the health emergency, they will always be inferior to the direct results of left-wing regimes.

The original art

The Italian variant

The Spanish variant

The Brazilian variant 1
("respiratory failure")

The Brazilian variant 2
("socialism and communism")

The These Are the Deaths... meme family

Figure 6. The *These Are the Deaths…* meme family

The curious thing about this series is that, in all transnational variants, the presence of the *hijab* is not highlighted, and, quite the opposite, the original locale is almost obscured to give way to an apathetic landscape, capable of encompassing any form of translation. While the clothing is observed in all the variants, its meaning becomes practically neutral, since the religious context is not evoked in the translations. We are facing a joke that initially refers to a specific local and religious context and is then universalised. In this case, far-right humour demands a neutral context, which allows us to build rapprochements between different local and regional contexts. It is no surprise that the motto of all these variants is also generic to the point that it can be used in any cultural or national context. Strictly speaking, these memes are autonomous in relation to the context. They can be read and understood perfectly by any individual.

Here, it also seems that the far-right is the prevalent segment in appropriating this type of humour since it serves the desire to build an international cooperation network. Populist rhetoric is a particularly efficient instrument for this expedient, as it tends to empty signifiers and build commonplaces. Communism, poverty, hunger, "respiratory failure", these would be our true enemies. All of them, it should be noted, are capable of being experienced by any nation. The populist tone is expressed in the false dialectic and again in the allegedly counter-hegemonic Manichaeism induced by the outcome. Here, there is a movement from the particular to the universal.

6. Conclusions

This study analysed how far-right humour can present an experience of building meanings shared transcultural or transnationally. It investigated memes produced and circulated by supporters of former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro on WhatsApp. Through an interpretative approach, based on online ethnography combined with discourse analysis, memes and their respective variants were observed based on three priority dimensions that reflect the translation operation: adaptation to the context, differentiation or comparison, and universalisation.

The article allows us to understand, albeit partially, how far-right groups have articulated common guidelines and agendas, despite adaptations to local contexts, and have used similar expedients in digital communication all over the globe. One could note an environment of mutual influence, from quiddity to universality and vice-versa. Therefore, although these groups incorporate the language of memes as a form of communication, it should be noted that the appeal to amateurism and the way in which humour allows trivialising dangerous speech and hateful expressions as simple jokes are some of the keys that justify its use as a repertoire of far-right groups.

In general terms, the incorporation of foreign references, notably from global pop culture, by far-right memes reflects a movement already widely discussed in the literature, on how memes can work as agents of globalisation. But it also allows an understanding that far-right humour aims to soften a given discourse or make it palatable to an audience that may not be fully aware of all references, but consume pop culture genres. This kind of use shows how far-right humour appropriates the global dimension and imperialist capitalism to penetrate the popular imagination and build deep memetic frames (Phillips & Milner, 2021), which will serve as the basis for meme wars (Donovan et al., 2022).

The opposite strategy, of erasing specific local references to give way to a universal frame, which favours its application in transnational contexts, highlights not only the media lingua franca feature of memes (Milner, 2013), but also how the international far-right has created connections in transnational circuits, advocating for common agendas, sharing similar cultural references and even producing and circulating the same content. This behaviour has been efficient in articulating a reactionary global network. Memes are the spearhead of this strategy

and encourage the perception of these movements from common and universal values, when in reality they are just the result of operations of semiotic detour and recontextualisation. Thus, while it is common to think of far-right digital humour in terms of generic object-labelled exploitables that allow contextual appropriations, it is clear that the opposite operation is also striking, that is, the transformation of a specific object-labelled into a neutral landscape that can be appropriated in transnational or transcultural contexts.

Understanding how this far-right communication has operated, especially in light of such vigorous outcomes, such as Trump's victory in 2016 in the United States, Bolsonaro's in 2018 in Brazil, or more recently Milei's in 2023 in Argentina, among many other examples, including Asia and Europe, is absolutely essential. If the present study does not reveal how falsehoods can be countered, it allows us to understand how humour has become one of the most striking repertoires of the so-called "alt-right" or "new right".

In the highlighted cases, it is clear that apologetic discourse, fundamentalism and belligerence are important rhetorical matrices for these groups. But, more important than observing the themes purely and simply, the ways of constructing and articulating these discourses seem to be the essential thing to be discussed. In this sense, despite being an interpretive analysis on a limited sample of cases and particularly focused on a Global South context, we understand that some conclusions may, if not provide inferences to other contexts, at least serve as input for further reflections about how far-rights in various parts of the world have used humour as a rhetorical device.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the guest editors of this special issue for the invitation to submit an article and the editors of EJHR, the blind reviewers and other colleagues for their comments on the preliminary version of this manuscript.

References

Bakhtin, M. (1984). *Rabelais and his world*. Indiana University Press.

Baldwin-Philippi, J. (2018). The technological performance of populism. *New Media & Society, 21*(2), 376-397. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444818797591

Bennett, W. L., & Toft, A. (2008). Identity, technology, and narratives: Transnational activism and social networks. In A. Chadwick & P. N. Howard (Eds.), *The Routledge handbook of internet politics*. Routledge.

Bergamo, M. (2023). Toffoli diz que prisão de Lula é um dos maiores erros judiciários do país e pede investigação. *Folha de S. Paulo,* 6 September 2023. Retrieved 17 September 2023, from https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/monicabergamo/2023/09/toffoli-diz-que-prisao-de-lula-e-um-dos-maiores-erros-judiciarios-do-pais-e-pede-investigacao.shtml

Billig, M. (2001). Humour and hatred: The racist jokes of the Ku Klux Klan. *Discourse & Society, 12*(3), 267-289. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926501012003001

Bogerts, L., & Fielitz, M. (2018). "Do you want meme war?" Understanding the visual memes of the German Far Right. In M. Fielitz & N. Thurston (Eds.), *Post-digital cultures of the far right*. Transcript Verlag.

Boukes, M., & Hameleers, M. (2020). Shattering populists' rhetoric with satire at elections times: The effect of humorously holding populists accountable for their lack of solutions. *Journal of Communication, 70*(4), 574–597. https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqaa020

Boxman-Shabtai, L., & Shifman, L. (2013). When ethnic humor goes digital. *New Media & Society, 17*(4), 520-539. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444813506972

Chagas, V., & Da-Costa, G. (2023). WhatsApp and transparency: an analysis on the effects of digital platforms' opacity in political communication research agendas in Brazil. *Profesional De La información*, *32*(2). https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2023.mar.23

Chagas, V., & Massuchin, M. G. (2022). Repertórios e estratégias do ativismo digital de direita. In L. Tatagiba, D. R. Almeida, A. G. Lavalle & M. K. Silva (Eds.), *Participação e Ativismos: Entre Retrocessos e Resistências*. Zouk.

Chagas, V. (2024). Humor and nationalism in Bolsonarist far-right WhatsApp memes in Brazil. In H. D. Fernandez & J. Poblete (Eds.), *Internet, humor, and nation in Latin America*. University Press of Florida.

Chagas, V. (2023). Dolce farmeme: a retórica da brincadeira política [Dolce farmeme: the rhetoric of political play]. *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais*, *38*(111), 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1590/3811008/2023

Chiaro, D., & Kuipers, G. (2017). Introduction. *The European Journal of Humour Research*, *5*(4), 3-6. https://doi.org/10.7592/EJHR2017.5.4.chiaro1

Davies, C. (1998*). Jokes and their relation to society*. De Gruyter Mouton.

Davies, C. (2011). *Jokes and targets*. Indiana University Press.

Denisova, A. (2020). *Internet memes and society: Social, cultural, and political contexts*. Routledge.

Freud, S. (2017). *Freud (1905) - Obras Completas volume 7: O chiste e sua relação com o inconsciente*. Companhia das Letras.

Gerbaudo, P. (2018). Social media and populism: an elective affinity? *Media, Culture & Society*, *40*(5), 745–753. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443718772192

Gross, K. (1901). *The play of man*. D. Appleton and Company.

Know Your Meme (2019). Death knocking on doors. *Know Your Meme*. Retrieved 17 September 2023, from https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/death-knocking-on-doors

Know Your Meme (2018). The silent protector. *Know Your Meme*. Retrieved 17 September 2023, from https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/the-silent-protector

Kristensen, N. N., & Mortensen, M. (2021). 'Don't panic people! Trump will tweet the virus away': memes contesting and confirming populist political leaders during the COVID-19 crisis. *Information, Communication & Society*, *24*(16), 2442-2458. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2021.1972127

Laclau, E. (2007). *On Populist Reason*. Verso.

Laineste, L., & Voolaid, P. (2016). Laughing across borders: Intertextuality of internet memes. *The European Journal of Humour Research*, *4*(4), 26-49. https://doi.org/10.7592/ejhr2016.4.4.laineste

Lamerichs, N., Nguyen, D., Melguizo, M. C. P., Radojevic, R., & Lange-Böhmer, A. (2018). Elite male bodies: The circulation of alt-right memes and the framing of politicians on Social Media. *Participations*, *1*(15), 180–206.

LDS Church (2023). Fatos e Estatísticas. *A Igreja de Jesus Cristo dos Santos dos Últimos Dias [Portuguese Version]*. Retrieved 17 September 2023, from https://noticias-br.aigrejadejesuscristo.org/fatos-e-estatisticas

Lobanov, N. (2020). "Twittare allo Specchio?" Analisi delle Reazioni su Twitter della Destra Radicale Italiana intorno a un Crimine D'Odio. *Storie e Linguaggi*, *5*(2), 125-159.

Mendonça, R. M., & Caetano, R. (2020). Populism as parody: The visual self-presentation of Jair Bolsonaro on Instagram. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, *26*(1), 210-235. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161220970118

Menezes, L. F. (2021). Jornal chileno El Mercurio não publicou charge em que Bolsonaro barra comunismo no Brasil. *Aos Fatos*, July 6, 2021. Retrieved 17 September 2023, from https://www.aosfatos.org/noticias/jornal-chileno-el-mercurio-nao-publicou-charge-em-que-bolsonaro-barra-comunismo-no-brasil/

Milner, R. M. (2013). Pop polyvocality: Internet memes, public participation, and the Occupy Wall Street Movement. *International Journal of Communication*, *7*, 2357-2390.

Moreno-Almeida, C., & Gerbaudo, P. (2021). Memes and the Moroccan far-right. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, *26*(4), 882-906. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161221995083

Nagle, A. (2017). *Kill all normies: Online culture wars from 4Chan and Tumblr to Trump and the alt-right*. Zero Books.

Nissenbaum, A., & Shifman, L. (2018). Meme templates as expressive repertoires in a globalizing world: A cross-linguistic study. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *23*(5), 294-310. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcmc/zmy016

Oring, E. (2008). *Engaging humor*. University of Illinois Press.

Pérez, R. (2013). Learning to make racism funny in the 'color-blind' era: Stand-up comedy students, performance strategies, and the (re)production of racist jokes in public. *Discourse & Society*, *24*(4), 478-503. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926513482066

Pérez, R. (2022). *The souls of white jokes: How racist humor fuels white supremacy*. De Gruyter Mouton.

Phillips, W., & Milner, R. (2017). *The ambivalent Internet: Mischief, oddity, and antagonism online*. MIT Press.

Revi A. V., R. (2014). Understanding obscenity and offensive humour: What's funny? *The European Journal of Humour Research*, *2*(3), 98-114. https://doi.org/10.7592/ejhr2014.2.3.revi

Santos, A. C. (2019). A circulação de memes eróticos da Dilma: vinculando públicos afetivos e fortalecendo fronteiras simbólicas no contexto do impeachment. Proceedings of the Compós, Brazil. https://proceedings.science/compos/compos-2019/trabalhos/a-circulacao-de-memes-eroticos-da-dilma-vinculando-publicos-afetivos-e-fortalece?lang=pt-br#

Schwartz-Shea, P., & Yanow, D. (2012). *Interpretive research design, concepts and processes*. Routledge.

Segev, E., Nissenbaum, A., Stolero, N., & Shifman, L. (2015). Families and networks of internet memes: The relationship between cohesiveness, uniqueness, and quiddity concreteness. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *20*(4), 417-433. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12120

Shifman, L., Levy, H., & Thelwall, M. (2014). Internet jokes: The secret agents of globalization? *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *19*(4), 727-743. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12082

Teitelbaum, B. (2020). *War for eternity: Inside Bannon's far-right circle of global power brokers*. Dey Street Books.

Tsai Yi Jing (2020). Bolsolixo versus Malddad: O uso dos memes para campanha negativa apócrifa no Twitter nas eleições de 2018 [Masters dissertation, Fluminense Federal University]. Fluminense Federal University Repository. https://app.uff.br/riuff/handle/1/22709

Wagner, A., Schwarzenegger, C. (2020). A populism of Lulz: The proliferation of humor, satire, and memes as populist communication in digital culture. In B. Krämer & C. Holtz-Bacha (Eds.), Perspectives on populism and the media: Avenues for research (pp. 313-332). Nomos.

Weaver, S. (2011). *The rhetoric of racist humour: US, UK and global race joking*. Routledge.